

Who are we?

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- University students who do security research on the side

Disclaimer

- ✦ Research exercise
- ✦ Travelling without a valid ticket is illegal
- ✦ The views expressed here are entirely our own
- ✦ Data and algorithm have been modified

Reverse Engineering

- ✦ Figuring out how something was designed
- ✦ Hacking stuff that isn't open source

White Box Reverse Engineering

- ✦ Can look at the implementation
- ✦ Closed source software, malware
- ✦ Always possible
- ✦ Dynamic Analysis (debuggers)
- ✦ Static Analysis (disassemblers, decompilers)
- ✦ Tons of cool research
- ✦ Not the topic of this talk

Black Box Reverse Engineering

- ✦ Can use the implementation
- ✦ File formats, network protocols, magnetic stripes
- ✦ Not necessarily possible
- ✦ System analysis
- ✦ Data analysis
- ✦ The topic of this talk

Contrived Example

```
$ ./mystery
```

```
Not enough arguments.
```

```
$ ./mystery 1
```

```
Not enough arguments.
```

```
$ ./mystery 1 2
```

```
Saved to out.txt
```

```
$ ./mystery 1 2 3
```

```
Too many arguments.
```

```
10000d61: mov    %rsp,%rbp
10000d64: sub    $0x40,%rsp
10000d68: mov    %edi,-0x4(%rbp)
10000d6b: mov    %rsi,-0x10(%rbp)
10000d6f: mov    -0x4(%rbp),%eax
10000d72: cmp    $0x2,%eax
10000d75: jg     10000d92
10000d77: lea   0x162(%rip),%rax    # 10000ee0
10000d7e: mov    %rax,%rdi
10000d81: callq 10000e8e <_puts@stub>
10000d86: movl  $0x1,-0x1c(%rbp)
10000d8d: jmpq  10000e5b
10000d92: mov    -0x4(%rbp),%eax
10000d95: cmp    $0x3,%eax
10000d98: jle   10000db5
10000d9a: lea   0x155(%rip),%rax    # 10000ef6
10000da1: mov    %rax,%rdi
10000da4: callq 10000e8e <_puts@stub>
10000da9: movl  $0x1,-0x1c(%rbp)
10000db0: jmpq  10000e5b
...
10000e5b: mov    -0x1c(%rbp),%eax
10000e5e: mov    %eax,-0x18(%rbp)
10000e61: mov    -0x18(%rbp),%eax
10000e64: mov    %eax,-0x14(%rbp)
10000e67: mov    -0x14(%rbp),%eax
10000e6a: add    $0x40,%rsp
10000e6e: pop    %rbp
10000e6f: retq
```

```
10000ee0: 4e6f7420 656e6f75 67682061 7267756d Not enough argum
10000ef0: 656e7473 2e00546f 6f206d61 6e792061 ents..Too many a
10000f00: 7267756d 656e7473 2e006f75 742e7478 rguments..out.tx
```


Case Study

- Mass Transit Ticketing System
- Magnetic stripe tickets


Which Tickets

- Need to figure out how they work
- How much data do we need?
- Which data do we need?
- Large dataset for analysis
- Specially-purchased data to answer specific questions


Data Analysis

- ✦ What do you know about the data?
- ✦ Look for correlations
- ✦ Look at common stuff first
- ✦ How would you encode the data?


Entropy - Random



Entropy - AES



Entropy - Case Study



Encryption

- ✦ Modern cryptography looks like random data
- ✦ Patterns indicate weaker cryptography
- ✦ Frequency analysis
- ✦ Entropy and compressibility

General Observations

- Must encode validity dates, origin, destination, etc.
- Physical ticket ID encodes station and machine ID

Finding Patterns

- Clearly not random

D11554868486844988551111111111CD5BCCF7CF83999DDD - 17:57:56

D667730B030B033400776666666666157C11DF10D39998AD - 17:57:59

DBBAED6DED6DEE9DDAABBBBBBBBBBC8A1CC02C94A0001ED - 17:58:02

Finding Patterns

- XOR each nibble with '1'

D11554868486844988551111111111CD5BCCF7CF83999DDD - 17:57:56



C00445979597955899440000000000DC4ADDE6DE92888CCC

Finding Patterns


- Data after XOR

D11554868486844988551111111111CD5BCCF7CF83999DDD - 17:57:56
D667730B030B033400776666666666157C11DF10D39998AD - 17:57:59
DBBAED6DED6DEE9DDAABBBBBBBBBBC8A1CC02C94A0001ED - 17:58:02



C00445979597955899440000000000DC4ADDE6DE92888CCC
B001156D656D655266110000000000731A77B976B5FFFCB
6001156D656D655266110000000000731A77B972F1BBBA56


Finding Patterns



C00445979597955899440000000000DC4ADDE6DE92888CCC
B001156D656D655266110000000000731A77B976B5FFFCB

Finding Patterns

- Left rotation of each nibble by 2
- $(\text{nibble} \ll 2) | (\text{nibble} \gg 2) \& 0xF$



C00445979597955899440000000000DC4ADDE6DE92888CCC
 B001156D656D6552661100000000000731A77B976B5FFFCB

Finding Patterns

- First ticket with bits ROled

C00445979597955899440000000000DC4ADDE6DE92888CCC



3001156D656D655266110000000000731A77B97B68222333

Finding Patterns

- Data after XOR (with first ticket ROLed)

D11554868486844988551111111111CD5BCCF7CF83999DDD - 17:57:56
D667730B030B033400776666666666157C11DF10D39998AD - 17:57:59
DBBAED6DED6DEE9DDAABBBBBBBBBBC8A1CC02C94A0001ED - 17:58:02



3001156D656D655266110000000000731A77B97B68222333
B001156D656D655266110000000000731A77B976B5FFFECEB
6001156D656D655266110000000000731A77B972F1BBBA56

Finding More Patterns

- ✦ Worked on those 3 tickets
- ✦ Failed on all other tickets
- ✦ Try other nibbles for XOR: 4, 8, 15, 23 then 42

Small vs Large Data Sets

- ✦ Small known data has little variation
 - ✦ Same values, more correlations
 - ✦ Great for making data look the same
- ✦ Large dataset will have much more variation
 - ✦ More values, less correlations
- ✦ Need to move to a larger data set

Data Gathering

- Magnetic stripe tickets
- Ticket vending machines
- Cost a lot of money to get a good sample
- Once used, they're basically free

Ticket Database

- About a thousand tickets
- Efficient data digitisation
- Need magnetic stripe data and printed data
- Took an afternoon

LEGO DEMO

case study

Automation

- Don't go through massive datasets by hand
- Automated search for correlations
- Automated search for possible encodings of known data

Search Scripts

- ✦ Group full data set into known field values
 - ✦ Origin station from physical ticket
- ✦ Easy with decrypted data
 - ✦ Our data only partially decoded
- ✦ Weak encryption
 - ✦ Brute force

Finding the Origin

- Find all nibbles that are the same between all tickets with same origin
- Iterate through all nibbles as the XOR key
- Output in a visual way

Analyse Results

11	PALL MALL		
11	OXFORD ST	0	
11	KINGS CROSS		
11	PICCADILLY	B	
11	FLEET ST		
11	BOND ST	B	44F2246AA8A
...			
12	PALL MALL		0E6
12	OXFORD ST	0	0744
12	KINGS CROSS		061
12	PICCADILLY	B	0755
12	FLEET ST		19A
12	BOND ST	B	0B6602EECE
...			
13	PALL MALL		E6
13	OXFORD ST	0	744
13	KINGS CROSS		61
13	PICCADILLY	B	755
13	FLEET ST		8B
13	BOND ST	B	B6602EECE

Finding More Fields

- ✦ Can now decode the ticket origin and destination stations
 - ✦ Origin and destination codes different
 - ✦ ROLing some nibbles corrects this
 - ✦ Data is still not decrypted completely
- ✦ Next want to find date and time

Date Field Location

- ✦ Origin Station vs Date
 - ✦ Downside: Less tickets with same date values
- ✦ Analyse data from any date with > 2 samples
- ✦ Find common nibbles with 95% accuracy

Date Field Location

```
...  
8 2011-06-16  _____322F_____   
8 2011-06-28  _____326A5_____   
8 2011-06-29  B_____3269_____   
8 2011-06-30  _____3268_____   
8 2011-07-01  _____326F2_____   
8 2011-07-02  _____326E_____   
8 2011-07-03  _____326D738AC8_____   
...
```


Date Field Encoding

- ✦ Origin Station vs Date
 - ✦ Upside: Better guess at encoding
 - ✦ Probably field incrementing each day
 - ✦ Pick a start date, SQL server uses 1900-01-01
- ✦ Use all samples this time
- ✦ Correlate and visualise

Date Field Encoding

Date, Days since 1900, field values

```
...
2011-06-16 40708 {'322f': 2}
2011-06-17 40709 {'322c': 1}
2011-06-18 40710
2011-06-19 40711
2011-06-20 40712
2011-06-21 40713
2011-06-22 40714
2011-06-23 40715 {'3226': 1}
2011-06-24 40716
2011-06-25 40717 {'3224': 1}
2011-06-26 40718
2011-06-27 40719
2011-06-28 40720 {'326a': 2}
2011-06-29 40721 {'3269': 3}
2011-06-30 40722 {'3268': 2}
2011-07-01 40723 {'326f': 2}
2011-07-02 40724 {'326e': 2}
2011-07-03 40725 {'326d': 2}
2011-07-04 40726 {'326c': 1}
...
```


Date Field

- ✦ Found the date field:
 - ✦ Last nibble changes once per day
 - ✦ Second and third nibbles change every 256 and 16 days
 - ✦ First nibble is always 0x3

Decryption

- ✦ Date field has large set of values
 - ✦ We know the likely encoding
 - ✦ Can use to work out more about encryption
- ✦ Have to ROL some values to make sense
- ✦ Number of days since 1/1/1970

Occam's Razor

- Look for the simplest solution
- If it seems too complex, it probably is

Generalised Algorithm

- Generalise algorithm over whole ticket:
 - XOR each nibble with the previous one
 - ROL nibbles (1, 2), (5, 6)... if bit set else (3, 4), (7, 8)...

Deciphering Fields

- ✦ Try to find fields that should be there
 - ✦ Guess how they would be stored
 - ✦ Dates are days since 1970, seconds?
- ✦ Group data by known values, see what they have in common
- ✦ Try changing values (not applicable here)
- ✦ Look for checksums, version numbers, padding, redundancy

Checksum

- Looked for complex checksums
- XORing all encoded nibbles together gives 0xF

Initialisation Vector
 Ticket type (single, return, weekly)
 Ticket scan status
 Valid from date
 Valid to date
 Origin station
 Destination station
 Transit type code (bit packed)
 Last scanned date
 Last scanned time
 Last scanned station
 Issuing machine ID
 Ticket serial number
 Concession type code
 Slogan Number
 Ticket Price
 Checksum

X 01 01 3BEC 3BEC 071 070 4 0000 00000 071 8BD 032E3 7E A 0010 X

Special Tickets

- Look different

800000001A22AA90D090D089310AA222222222239AB799EF9F07333BBA

- Many days trying to work out the “special encryption”
- Spent far too long on this:

(1A22AA9... >> 1) = D11554...

Information Leaks

- ✦ Get creative
 - ✦ Websites
 - ✦ Significant ordering
 - ✦ Do some research
- ✦ Offsets, outliers

Cool Things

- ✦ Physical serial numbers match fields, include station
- ✦ Rail enthusiasts detail *everything*
- ✦ Station IDs found on website
 - ✦ Constant offset

Custom Cryptography

- ✦ Has anything good ever come of this?
- ✦ Takes cryptographers years to do this right
- ✦ Strong cryptography is free and easy
- ✦ Learn about it before you use it

Responsible Disclosure

- ✦ Difficult
- ✦ Takes a while
- ✦ Changing large systems is hard
- ✦ Know the relevant laws
- ✦ Work with the organisation

Message from transport spokesperson

“We acknowledge the group for their interest and research in this important area. We continue to expand our monitoring and fraud protection mechanisms accordingly and are implementing stronger measures in our new technologies.

It should be recognised that fare evasion and product tampering is a criminal offence and such activities are investigated accordingly. It is also an offence and unethical to conduct tests on live systems without proper authorisation.

It is an offence to travel without a valid ticket. A ticket is not valid if it is defaced, mutilated or altered.”

Questions?